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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 30, 1982, the Public Service Commission 
.c) q1anted an application by Utah Power & Light Company 
, .. ~,l~L" or the "Company"), allowing it to adjust its Energy 
,, 0 lcJnring Account ("EBA") for the period September 1981, 
·~1ough August, 1982 (the "Relevant Period"), by transferring 
012,000 (representing approximately one-third of UP&L's 
:~venues from non-tariff sales during 1981) from the EBA to its 
"cneral account.
1 
The PSC Order was reversed by the Utah 
"11preme Court on May 22, 1986. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
By this Petition, UP&L seeks a rehearing of these 
~dses and the decision of the Court: (1) affirming the Order of 
'he PSC; or (2) remanding these cases to the PSC for additional 
:1ndings of fact and conclusions of law. 
1 In Re Application of Utah Power & Light Co., No. 
32-03~-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982), aff'd on 
reheJrin_g, No. 82-035-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah July 5, 1983), 
r~•·"d, LJta_h_~artment of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
, nUT:i!>;;iQn, Nos. 19361 and 19362, slip op. {Utah May 22, 
1 'lib). The PSC Order dated December 30, 1982, and the PSC 
·•2r on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, are collectively 
·~'~rred to herein as the "PSC Order". The Court's Opinion of 
0 Y 22, 1986, is referred to herein as the "Opinion". 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OV&R~OQKEQ 
OR MiSAPPREHENDED BY_IHE COURT 
UP&L claims that the Court's decision overlooks or 
misapprehends the following points of law or fact: 
I. THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE 
RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO 
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE APPLICATION_QJ:' 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, slip op. (P.S.C. 
Utah Aug. 2, 1982). 
III. IF THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE 
OF INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW CONCERNING THE EBA, IT SHOULD REMAND THESE 
CASES FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO BE MADE BY THE PSC. 
ARGUMENT 
A petition for rehearing is proper and should be 
granted where the court, in its original opinion, misapprehends 
or overlooks points of law or fact or where the findings and 
conclusions of the court, board or commission below are 
inadequate or unclear (thereby raising, in each instance, 
questions as to whether a correct result was or could be 
reached) or where it is necessary to correct an injustice in 
the original opinion. ~, ~. Kirchgestner v. Denver & 
R.G.W.R. Co., 118 Utah 37, 225 P.2d 754 (1950); Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure; 5 C.J.S. Appeals & Errors § 1411. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE RETROACTIVE 
RATEMAKING. 
A. The Court's Decision Erroneously Characterizes as 
pr_Qhib ti'Q_ "Retroactive Ratemaking" An Accounting Adjustment 
''~~i_g11 gL _A_;; the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking is 
~esig11 dL To Encourage Efficiency. 
"Before there can be retroactive ratemaking there must 
3t least be ratemaking." Southern California Edison Co. v. 
~'Lt;i_lic Utility Commission, 20 Cal. 3d 813, 576 P.2d 945, 144 
0 al. Reptr. 905 ( 1978). 
In its Order on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, the PSC 
staled, ~~ter alia, that "the proposed adjustment is consistent 
'ith Commission intent that the EBA eliminate inequitable 
rPsults or windfall benefits to either the Company or its 
ratepayers" and that the "proposed adjustment is consistent 
with other adjustments previously and currently made in the 
'Fnergy Balancing] Account procedure in that all are 
retruactive in nature and none alter the Commission approved 
<•te." Order on Rehearing No. 82-035-14 (P.S.C. Utah July 5, 
lJ83). 
The Court's decision overlooks the rationale behind 
'
1
·" rule against retroactive ratemaking and erroneously 
'"'"~terizes as prohibited "retroactive ratemaking" an 
counting adjustment designed and intended to avoid the same 
-3-
t hi11g the rule i tsc·lf srcks tn avoiJ. As the court recogni z• 
the general prnhi~ition against retroactive ratemaking is 
intenJed "to provide utilities with some incentive to operate 
efficiently Qpi_J}i_g_IJ at 2. The PSC Order al lowing the 
accounting adjustment in this case is consistent with this 
underlying policy because it encourages efficiency by 
protecting UP&L from being penalized for aggressively marketina 
excess energy production tc non-tariff users in an unusual 
situation of ab~ormally high reduced demand by tariff 
ratepayers where its generating capacity would otherwise remain 
idle. 
The Court misconstrued UP&L's argument that the 
a-counting adjustment effected by the PSC Order was not 
'. rna<tive ratemaking. The Court failed to note the 
difference between a change in the general rate charged tariff 
customers and the type of accounting adjustment allowed by the 
PSC Order. UP&L suu~ht one-time relief from the penalty 
imposed by the EBA system because of its unexpectedly high 
nnn-tariff sales and did not seek an increase in the general 
rates charged tariff customers. 
Without the modification made by the PSC's Order, thP 
EBA system provides A disincentive to make non-tariff sales. 
By applying the enti1e amrunl of all non-tariff revenues 
(instead of only that portion of those revenues which is equal 
to the energy costs of producing those revenues) as a general 
-4-
1 , rt against energy costs, the EBA system produces an 
'i•''"'i'.' penalty to the utility which attempts to keep costly 
, 11ties in use in times of reduced demand by tariff 
,. , payers. By stopping or reducing production from its 
'Jc1lities during such times, UP&L could reduce operating costs 
.cd net revenue losses. The EBA system, as applied without the 
1dit1cation made in the PSC Order, penalizes the utility which 
-~eps its facilities in operation and aggressively sells the 
'XCess capacity to non-tariff ratepayers. UP&L submits that it 
.~ anomalous, in the name of protecting against inefficiency, 
ta strike down a procedure which protects against inefficiency. 
The accounting adjustment proposed by UP&L is 
analogous to the accounting adjustment ordered by the 
California Public Utility Commission in Southern California 
tlis911 Co~, 576 P.2d 945, cited in the Opinion. In each case 
:here was an unusual one-time surfeit of funds in the energy 
calancing account. In each case, absent some adjustment, one 
1 1 uup either ratepayer or shareholder, would be unfairly 
~nalized. 2 In Southern California Edison the Court 
2 In Southern California Edison, the adjustment was 
'essitated by excess revenues in the fuel adjustment account 
« 1s··rl by a change in tax accounting procedure that resulted in 
" time, significant profits to the company. The Supreme 
' 111 of California allowed a one-time accounting modification 
pass some of the benefit on to ratepayers. 
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determined that such a one-time accounting modification was 
merely an equitable adjustment and did not constitute 
retroactive ratemaking. 
In the Opinion, the Court noted its assumption "that 
the EBA order was promulgated under the Commission's ample 
general power to fix rates and establish accounting 
procedures.• Opinion at 6, n. 4. The Court described the EBA 
as 
a rather unique device for handling not only the 
utilities' unstable fuel costs, but also other cost 
and revenue items which the PSC felt were subject to 
rapid and unpredictable fluctuation. 
Opinion at 3. The Court further noted that 
ideally, over the long term, the account is 
zeroed out, ~. the revenues flowing into 
the account will equal the expenditures 
charged to it. Thus, the EBA accomplishes 
the purpose of the pass-through legislation 
to allow expeditious rate response to those 
elements of cost which are subject to 
frequent fluctuation, and it does so without 
bypassing the more formal requirements of 
general rate making. 
Opinion at 4. If the EBA is recognized as principally an 
accounting device of the PSC to implement general pass-through 
legislation, it follows that the PSC should be able to 
authorize changes in the accounting procedure to allow that 
procedure to more accurately reflect proper allocations of 
-6-
rgy costs. The Commission must have the continuing power 
J responsibility to administer and improve the EBA system. 
·L the time the EBA was created, the PSC contemplated that 
o~counting adjustments would need to be made periodically to 
correct inaccuracies in the accounting procedures. See, In Re 
1< . .QQlii;;9tion of Utah Power & Light Co., Nos. 78-035-21 and 
"9-035-03, slip op. at 16 (P.S.C. Utah July 20, 1979). In 
f~rtherance of this continuing power and responsibility, the 
fSC has, in the PSC Order and in the Mountain Fuel case, supra, 
encouraged and directed these parties, the Division of Public 
Utilities and "other interested parties" to consider the 
solutions to the inequitable results which occur in the EBA. 
PSI Order, No. 82-035-14 )P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982); Mountain 
fuel case, .s..u.?..Li!.. at 6. 
Since the EBA is intended to be "zeroed out" on a 
periodic basis, it is essentially an account balancing 
mechanism designed to achieve equitable adjustments and the 
tair and equitable exercise by the Commission of its general 
1'owers on a continuing basis. Under the Court's decision this 
Purpose is frustrated by a rigid and inviolate application of 
thP rule against "retroactive ratemaking." UP&L submits that 
1 te C0urt's decision effectively emasculates the EBA system and 
··c~ludes it from being fairly administered. 
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B. Even if the Court Does Deem the Modifica~ions t 
the EBA Account to be Retroactive Ratemaking,_J,JP&L Believes 
that the Court Should have Allowed An Exception to the Generel 
Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking. 
The prohibition against retroactive ratemaking is not 
absolute. "The spectre of retroactive ratemaking must not be 
viewed as a talismatic inhibition against the application of 
principles based upon equity and common sense." Roberts v. 
Narragansett Electric Co., #82-156-M.P., ~- Ql). at 5 (R.I., 
Jan 11, 1984). The court in its Opinion recognized the 
possibility of exceptions, at least implicitly, when it stated 
the rule that utilities "are generally not permitted to adjust 
their rates retroactively to compensate for unanticipated costs 
or unrealized revenues." Opinion at 2 (emphasis added). The 
key factor in determining whether to apply the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking should be whether application of the 
rule will further the public policy rationales underlying the 
rule, or will ultimately frustrate those rationales. 
The real fear behind retroactive ratemaking is that 
"if a utility's income were guaranteed, the company would lose 
all incentive to operate in an efficient, cost-effective 
manner, thereby leading to higher operating costs and eventual 
rate increases." Narragansett Electric Co. v, Burke, 415 A.2d 
177, (R.I. 1980). It is that public policy of stimulating 
efficiency that should guide the court in determining whether 
to apply the rule prohibiting retroactive ratemaking. 
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A great many states have recognized that utilities 
• 111~ he allowed retroactive rate increases to offset the 
r!c ·ts of unusual circumstances such as freak winter storms. 
5~~. e.g., !iQ_LLQ_g_ansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177, 
\~.I. 1980) (citing cases from Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
~ansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New 
-1sey, New York and Pennsylvania.) The one-time accounting 
2d1uslment sought by UP&L is prompted by an analogous unusual 
:1ccumstance. In each of these cases: the change in revenue 
-, expenses was a result of an unforeseen and unforeseeable 
·1rcumstance; the utility did its best to mitigate the negative 
effects of the situation and to operate as efficiently as 
possible; and the purpose of the accounting adjustment was to 
spread the risk associated with the incident fairly between the 
shareholders and the ratepayers. 
Application of the rule against retroactive ratemaking 
1 n this case does not further any of the public policies behind 
Lhe general rule. A rigid application of the general rule 
a~a1nst retroactive ratemaking in this case situation will 
iiscourage attempts to market excess generation capacity and 
actually defeat the purpose of the rule. This reality is 
llustrated by the following statement of the court in 
1agan~gU;: 
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The next time a storm of this magnitude 
occurs, the company would have no incentive 
to hire outside line and tree crews to 
restore service efficiently and swiftly to 
customers if no reimbursement for 
extraordinary expenses would be 
forthcoming. Thus, dpplication of the rule 
to expenses related to such an emergency 
situation so inexorably related to the 
public health and safety would serve to 
thwart the goal of efficient customer 
service. 
~<iqansett Electric Co. -,~Burke, 415 A.2d at 179. This 
Court should recognize an exception to the general rule against 
retroactive ratemaking in extraordinary situations such as th~ 
one presented in the present case. 
The Court's holding that the rule against retroactive 
ratemdking precludes the adjustment to the EBA allowed by the 
PSC Order fails to recognize that the effect of the EBA system 
and t'iP '~"'rt· s ruling in this case is to retroactively reduce 
the rates to the ratepayers by the entire amount of UP&L's 
non-tariff revenues during the Relevant Period (less the amount 
thereof allocated to defray energy costs). Thus, it is not a 
question of whether or not "retroactive ratemaking" has or h~s 
not occurred but whether or not UP&L is to be penalized for its 
ctforts to earn nrn-tariff revenues from which the ratepayers 
can be benefited. Had UP&L not utilized its facilities to meke 
non-tariff sales lhere would have been no resulting benefit 
available to the ratepayers. Fairness requires that UP&L n0t 
be penalized for its effort to avoid this result. 
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POINT I I 
'IHE DECISION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO 
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE THE APPLICATION OF 
MOUNJAl_N FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, No. 81-057-19 slip op. 
(P.S.C. Utah Aug. 2, 1982). 
In its original opinion, the Court stated: 
Neither the facts nor the opinion in 
Ap~lication of Mountain Fuel Supply to 
Ad~t the Base Rate for Natural Gas 
Services in Utah, Case No. 81-057-19, cited 
by the PSC as precedent for this action, are 
in the record, and that case apparently was 
not appealed to this Court. Therefore, we 
are unable to determine if there were 
similar circumstances or if, in fact, an 
identical diversion of funds was allowed. 
~1 ~'~_1i_on at 5, n.3. 
The Mountain Fuel case should have been considered by 
the Court because it is essentially identical to the present 
-•se on its facts and is an important precedent and statement 
,f the policy of the PSC in administering the EBA system. In 
~nt_J1_T1 _fuel as in this case, the PSC allowed non-tariff 
:.enues which were credited to an energy balancing account 
:~:untain Fuel Supply Account No. 191), to be transferred to 
.'s general revenue accounts. As in the present case, Mountain 
.,., had suffered significant losses from reductions in demand 
te11ff ratepayers during the early 1980s. Because of those 
1 «•:,s, it also made efforts to generate significant 
1 1 r1ff sales revenues (i.e., revenues from various 
-11-
transportation arrangements, sales for resale, and the sale 
liquid hydrocarbons). It also sought to have the EBA 
procedures modified to allow a portion of these non-tariff 
revenues to be transferred to its general revenue account. Ic 
approving the stipulation between the Division and Mountain 
Fuel allowing this adjustment, the PSC noted that in a previous 
Mountain Fuel Supply matter (Case No. 80-057-10), it had 
specifically authorized Mountain Fuel to: 
petition this commission for exceptions to 
balancing account treatment for "other 
revenues," if in the company's opinion other 
treatment is warranted. Such requests will 
be considered on a case by case basis and 
will take into account financial stability 
of the company. 
Mou n_Lij n _E_utl , a t 5 . 
Fairness and consistency in administering the EBA 
system requires that UP&L be allowed the same kind of 
adjustment in its EBA with respect to the unusually high 
non-tariff revenues received by it during the unusual 
circumstances which existed during the Relevant Period as 
Mountain Fuel was allowed under similar circumstances during 
essentially the same period. The Court should consider the 
Mountain F~ case as an additional reason for treating the PSC 
Order as something other than "retroactive ratemaking" or as ar 
exception to the general rule against retroactive ratemaking. 
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.--J· es 
The Mountain Fuel case was referred to in several 
in the record on appeal and in oral argument. 3 UP&L 
, ,ic,<>nably believed that the Mountain Fuel case was properly 
b~lure the Court and was not aware until the opinion was issued 
that thP Court did not consider this case to be part of the 
~cord. 4 Whether or not it was physically included in the 
-vrd, the Court can and should take judicial notice of it as 
.1 did with other court and agency decisions which were 
,~ferred to in the briefs but not physically included in in the 
~cord. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 39.02 (4th Ed. 
'973). As a convenience to the Court, UP&L has attached a copy 
of Lhe MoJ!!ltain Fuel case to this Petition as Appendix A. 
3 Brief of Intervenor Utah Power & Light Co. at 4, 
1ta_l! JJJillsi_rtment of Business Regulation v. Public Services 
C;irnrnissiQD, Nos. 19361 & 19362, slip op. (Utah 1986); In Re 
!Wfllti::i'!tion of Utah Power & Light Co., No. 82-035-14, slip op. 
at 3 (P.S.C. Utah December 30, 1982) (mentioning the Mountain 
~c~l case in its findings of fact); In Re Application of Utah 
i~weL_kLight Co., No. 82-035-14, slip op. at 4 (P.S.C. Utah 
frecember 30, 1982) (mentioning the Mountain Fuel case in its 
.·onclusions). 
4 UP&L has been unable to obtain a copy of the 
''rJex of the record on appeal before the Court. The clerk has 
0 1c1sed it that the Court cannot locate its copy, nor does the 
' 11 1 ir Service Commission, the Attorney General's office, or 
U~partment of Business Regulation, Division of Public 
1 1ties have a copy. 
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IF THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE OF 
INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CONCERNING THE EBA, IT SHOULD REMAND THESE CASES FOR 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO 
BE MADE BY THE PSC. 
UP&L urges the Court in this Petition to affirm the 
PSC Order and preserve the equitable balancing effect and 
application of the EBA system. Alternatively, in the event the 
Court feels that the PSC Order does not contain sufficient 
findings and conclusions about the EBA for the Court to 
entirely affirm the PSC Order, UP&L urges the Court to remand 
these cases to the PSC with direction to make such findings and 
conclusions. 
The threshold question in an administrative 
appeal is whether the record is adequate to 
permit meaningful judicial review. If it is 
not, and the basis of an administrative 
decision is unclear, it may be necessary to 
remand the case for preparation of a record 
revealing the agency's reasoning process. 
Only by focusing on the relationship between 
evidence and findings, and between findings 
and ultimate action, can we determine 
whether the agency's action is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
White v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 678 P.2d 
1319, 1322 (Alaska 1984) (citations omitted). The court may 
raise the question of the adequacy of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the administrative agency on its own 
-14-
, 2 ~ugn1zance even if the issue is not properly raised by the 
ort1cs on appeal. Id. at 1322. 
The issues raised in this case are of great importance 
- 0 the PSC, the utilities and the ratepayers. It is critical 
tnat the PSC be given a chance to fully explain its reasoning 
1~fore the Supreme Court makes a final decision on the matter. 
The ratepayers, and the utilities, are entitled to an appellate 
1ecision based on an adequate and comprehensive set of findings 
~f fact and conclusions of law by the PSC. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, UP&L respectfully requests 
fhat this Petition for Rehearing be granted. 
DATED this 19th day of June, 1986. 
By·~4.J,~~~~:£f.-~/.::t=~~=-!--+-~~ 
Ro ld . Ocke 
Attorneys for 
Defendant Uta 
Light Company 
170 South Main Street 
Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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The undersigned counsel for Petitioner-Intervenor, 
Ulah Power & Light Company, hereby certifies that the foregoin~ 
Petition for Rehearing is brought in good faith and not for 
delay. 
By~--ff-~-~~~~~~--1-~~~~~;---~ 
Ro 
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